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PRIVILEGED COiMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE
DOCTOR AND HIS PATIENT-AN
ANOMALY OF THE LAW
THoIAS H. S. CuRD '
On the theory that it is easier to prevent a bad situation before it arises than to try to correct it thereafter, the attention of
the bar is called to the doctrine of privileged communications between a doctor and his patient as it now exists in some form in
twenty-four states of the Union and in Alaska, Porto Rico, the
Philippines and the District of Columbia. West Virginia, we are
glad to say, has not been harassed with this troublesome doctrine
and with the many inequitable features growing out of it. Yet, in
West Virginia, it is recognized by statute in justice of the peace
courts, having been taken from the New York law when chapter
fifty of the code on justices of the peace was incorporated bodily
from the New York laws into our Code.
It is surprising how widespread is the belief, both in the medical and legal professions in West Virginia, that this privilege
exists generally in this state in litigated cases. A recent graduate
of a good medical school, in conversation with West Virginia attorneys, made the statement that the doctor enjoyed the same relationship toward his patient in respect to privileged communications
that the lawyer did toward his client. One attorney denied the
correctness of the statement. Some seemed to think there did exist
some such favorable consideration for the doctor and his patient
but were in doubt. Inquiry among various attorneys did indicate
that a majority are of the opinion that privileged communications
*Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Welch, West Virginia.
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exist in West Virginia and that they exist between the doctor and
his patient at common law. Practically all doctors seem to have
some mental reservation when approached to give information
relative to matters of a medical nature, if they do not absolutely
refuse to give it.
A consideration of the situation seems justifiable in view of
the confusion obtaining in both the medical and legal professions
in West Virginia. No such privilege exists at common law, either
as between the doctor and his patient or the priest and the penitent,
but only as between the attorney and his client and the husband
and wife. The privilege as given in about half the states of the
Union, as originally adopted by statute in those states, has since
been modified, limited, or, in effect, emasculated, either by a statutory amendment or by interpretation and construction of the
courts. Surprising as it is to find these statutes in half the states,
it is still more surprising to find how unsatisfactory they have been
in all of them and although it has come to be generally recognized
that such statutes have not served the purpose intended, no state
has repealed the statute in whole since the first one in America
was adopted by the state of New York in 1828. Various expressions of derision and disapproval of the privilege have been
used by courts and writers, especially by Wigmore and Greenleaf,
such as "farce," "parody on justice," "dribbling,"
"sop,"
"farcicality."
The reason for the New York Legislature's adopting such a statute is not plain unless it was instigated by physicians
who felt their dignity might be considered of somewhat lesser
quality than that of the lawyers until their profession was placed
in the same position with respect to testifying about their patients'
ailments as that occupied by the lawyer and his client's business,
not realizing that the analogy between the two professions and that
the reasons for the different rulings were entirely different, and, no
doubt, also not realizing that by a strict construction of the first
statute passed, and of other similar ones, a physician sued for malpractice could neither testify for himself nor have any other
physician who attended the patient testify for him.
The later statutes have very generally followed the New York
one passed in 1828, which was as follows:
"No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery
shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may
have acquired in attending any patient in a professional char-
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acter and which information was necessary to enable him to
prescribe for such patient as a physician or do any act for
him as a surgeon."'
The purpose of this statute was to promote secrecy and privacy
as to the ailments of the patient as to which, if they became known,
the patient might be humiliated or embarrassed by reason of the
kind of disease, but it overshot the mark. Careful consideration
obviously was not given to its far-reaching effects. The courts
and legislatures have been confused about it ever since. Under its
broad terms, the physician sued for malpractice would be unable
to testify in his own behalf. It extended the privilege, not only in
respect to diseases as to which the patient was ashamed, but in
respect to any other illness or injury, regardless of the fact that
the patient and doctor made no effort to conceal the illness and
had no reason to do so. It applied to those cases like death, birth
and diseases which the law required the attending physician to
report and to make a public record of. The privilege prevails in
a lawsuit where the patient as plaintiff files his complaint telling
the world all about his disease or injury, where he testifies fully
about it, but the attending physician's mouth is closed to the real
truth of the situation. It is so broad that the patient is permitted
to commit a crime or perpetrate a fraud and shield himself behind
the physician. Although the statute purports to restrict the
privilege to information necessary to enable the physician to treat
the patient, the courts almost universally have held that it applies
to any other information obtained by word of mouth or from observation while treating the patient and whether necessary to treatment or not. Even ravishers and murderers have invoked the
privilege to cover their own guilt. The statute of New York and
its imitations are so broad that in testamentary cases where mental
capacity or sanity is at issue, the mouth of the physician is closed.
In insurance cases where the privilege is oftenest invoked, the attending physician in many cases is the only person who can give
the true answer to the issue involved. It has worked both ways.
In Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co.,2 the beneficiary in a policy
was not permitted to recover for death by accident because the
physician who knew the answer was not permitted to testify as to
the causal connection between the injury and the death. In most
cases the plaintiff is given the advantage for the same reason. In
1N. Y. RLv. STAT. (1828) 11, 406.
2 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920).
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the numerous cases reviewed, we have found no case which fits into
the alleged motive and purpose behind the statute -to prevent
humiliation or shame from disclosure of the nature of disease. In
all these cases the plaintiff has been eager to tell all about his illness or injury, or to have other people tell about it provided their
story agrees with his. But the physician who knows the truth and
really knows the answer to the matter in issue is not permitted to
tell it. The curious results following such a statute are interesting.
The obvious purpose, of course, was secrecy and privacy of
information given to or obtained by a physician while attending
the patient on the theory that if the patient expected such information to be divulged, probably information would be withheld
from him necessary to treat the patient -largely a fiction. Wigmore says these conditions should exist to warrant the privilege:
"(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties; ....
"(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8
He points out that neither of these conditions exists in respect
to the relationship between the doctor and the patient and that at
common law this relationship in all instances had been and still
is being adequately taken care of without the necessity of statutes
which only confuse and work an injury in practically all cases
where applied. The rule seems never to be invoked to conceal
secrets but a careful consideration of the cases would seem to show
that it is used to promote fraud in order to win lawsuits.
The physicittn, jealous of the dignity and honor of his profession, says that if the lawyer and client have the privilege extended
in their relationship, why not, by analogy, the doctor and patient.
As Wigmore further points out, no argument has more fallacy
than that of analogy. The reason for a different rule in each instance is the difference of conditions and circumstances under which
the information is obtained. In the case of the lawyer, it is given
in the expectation that litigation will follow or has already begun
and the attorney could not plan his case for his client without
knowledge of the facts and he would not want them if he knew
he would be placed on the witness stand to testify against his own
85

WiGmom, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 1-2.
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client in a case he was expected to defend. The essential thing in
consulting a lawyer in litigation is non-disclosure of the facts. The
essential thing in consulting a doctor is to have him effect a cure.
In one case the facts are given to keep secret, in the other to cure
an illness, and no thought of secrecy occurs to the patient. It is
neither expected nor wanted by the patient at the time the information is obtained in the overwhelming majority of cases. When
revealed, a confidence is abused in one case and in the other it is
not.
A casual study of the New York and other statutes reveals
the inconsistency in a trial in which facts material to the issue,
or even the issue itself, are suppressed, although already published
to the world in the form of a death certificate on record or by a
statute requiring a physical examination or the physician to report
certain diseases, causes of death and information regarding births.
The world already knows the facts from published records
furnished by the physician but when it comes to a trial of a case,
to get at the true facts and to obtain justice, the truth is suppressed
and the physician's mouth is there closed. The injuries resulting
from such statutes gradually revealed themselves and have resulted
in many amendments. In Wisconsin a physician now, by amendment, can testify in his own behalf when sued for malpractice. 4 A
Michigan statute abolished the privilege for sexual diseases in certain cases while retaining it as to other facts.' In New York, a
physician employed to examine the defendant for sanity, was not
used on trial by the defendant but the court required him to testify
for the prosecution.' In Iichigan, in the case of the illegal marriage of persons sexually diseased, a physician who attended both
husband and wife was compelled to testify at the instance of the
prosecution. 7 In Missouri, the attending physician in an abortion
case may be compelled to testify as to a dying declaration.8 In
New York, the statute has been further amended that where the
patient is a child under sLxteen and a victim of crime, the physician
may be required to testify,9 but Wigmore says, "this proviso is a
poor sop to the demands of justice and does not palliate the injustice of closing the physician's mouth where the victim was an
4 WIS. STAT. (1911)

c. 322.

M cH. CouP. LAws (1915) § 11367.
8 People v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446, 93 N. E. 57 (1910).
7 Dick v. Supreme Body, 138 Mich. 372, 101 N. W. 564 (1904).
s Mo.STAT. (1907) 245.
9 N.Y. STAT. (1905) c.331.
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In many instances where the courts have seen the injustice of these statutes, various devices have been adopted to avoid
the effect of the statutes. Mostly, it is called a waiver. With such
an absurd situation facing the courts, naturally there have been
many dissenting opinions and the courts have resorted to subtle
constructions, interpretations and even subterfuge to get around
the plain letter of the statute. Sometimes the statute provides for
a waiver by consent, or where the statutes do not so provide, some
courts permit a waiver anyhow, but this only brought on more
confusion. If the patient was dead or an infant, some courts held
the parents or representatives could waive for them, but the larger
number held they could not. These interpretations occur: A third
party is present with the physician. Some courts say the privilege
is not waived as to the physician. Some hold the privilege waived
as to both physician and third party. Some say it is waived only
as to the third party and not as to the doctor, and some that it is
not waived as to either. In some jurisdictions it is held that the
mere bringing of a suit waives this privilege, others are to the
contrary. In a Washington case, Noelle v. Hoquiam Lumber Co.,"
holding that the suit and testimony given in court by the plaintiff
did not waive, the dissenting opinion quoted with approval:
" '. ... Is it to be tolerated that, to mulct another in damages,
he [the plaintiff] may inflame a jury with a false or exaggerated story of his injuries and suffering, and yet a physician whom he has consulted is not to be allowed to prevent
the meditated injustice by a truthful statement of the case ?' "12
In some jurisdictions where two or more physicians are involved,
if the patient uses one physician as a witness, the privilege is
waived as to the other examining at the same time, but not if the
examination is made at a different time,18 and still others hold that
if the plaintiff uses one physician, the privilege is waived as to the
1
other physician regardless as to when the examination was made. '
In New York in 1933, the court reversed its former ruling and held
that where the plaintiff called one physician, the defendant can
call the other who had treated the patient three years prior to the
L05 W GmoRE, EviDENCE § 2380, pp. 203-4, footnbte 5.
11 47 Wash. 519, 92 Pae. 372 (1907).
12 Id. at 528, 92 Pae. 375.
'3 United States Nat. Life & Casualty Co. v. Heard, 148 0kla. 274, 298 Pac.
619 (1931).
14 Epstein v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S. W. 699 (1913).
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time the other physician treated him -to prevent fraud. 15 In one
state two physicians were not allowed to testify in a malpractice
case although the defendant was permitted to do so. In some
instances we find the same court holding both ways in a case where
heirs of a person introduce a death certificate and objection is
made to the evidence of the physician who made it. In California
the privilege was held waived where the information was obtained
by a doctor in the presence of the mother, husband and brother 6 most intimate relationships. If there ever was a case where secrecy
should have been accorded it was here. In New York the jail
physician of the accused was permitted to testify against him as to
his sanity. 17 In Wisconsin in a prosecution for rape, the court, in
order to avoid the effect of the statute, permitted the doctor to
testify whether a child had a venereal disease, it having been shown
the accused had it.' s In this case the court said the information
was not obtained by the physician to aid in treatment - obviously
a wrong conclusion and construction in avoidance of the broad
effect theretofore generally given the statute, both in that state
and elsewhere. In Michigan, the court holds that the case of a
contested will constitutes an exception but cites no authority for
such an exception.' 9 Also in Michigan it was held by a divided
court that a physician who attended the plaintiff for an injury
could testify he had liquor on his breath since this information
was not necessary to his treatment - absolutely a correct interpretation but contrary to all the holdings theretofore in that state or
elsewhere.2 0 In Rein-arn v. Dennin,2 it was contended the statute
should not be applied to will cases, but the court would not read
this exception into the statute. It called attention to the fact that
in these cases and in insurance cases the statute excludes the most
reliable and vital evidence which is absolutely needed for the ends
of justice, but said the remedy is with the legislature and not with
the courts. In the Maine case, 22 it was conceded that there was no
evidence on which to base a verdict for the plaintiff against the
insurance company on account of accidental death unless the physiis Steinberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 263 N. Y. 45, 188 N. E. 152 (1933).
1 Horowitz v. Sacks, 89 Cal. App. 336, 265 Pac. 281 (1928).
17 People v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446, 93 N. E. 57 (1910).
18 James v. State, 124 Wis. 130, 102 N. W. 320 (1905).
10 Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers, 196 Mich. 247, 163 N. W. 10 (1917).
20 Perry v. Hannagan, 257 Mich. 120, 241 N. W. 232 (1932).
21103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E. 320 (1886).
22 Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920).
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cian testified as to the causal relationship between the injury and
the death.
Undoubtedly, there should be a gentlemen's understanding
between the physician and the patient that the physician should
not go out and voluntarily discuss most intimate matters affecting
his patient's illness, but where the rights of third parties become
involved or the rights of the public to the extent of litigation or
prosecution for violating the laws, the truth should never be suppressed, which in all these instances either aids in defrauding some
individual or infringing on the rights of the public at large. That
is what these statutes now accomplish. They have so been interpreted by courts and amended by statute, that their only remaining function is to suppress evidence of the truth to win a
lawsuit and not to protect the privacy of an ailment. The full
effect of them now seems to be limited more to the question of
sanity in will cases and to insurance cases. In such instances, it
is practically impossible to determine the actual truth as to illness,
injury or mental condition, without medical testimony. At the
time the physician attended a patient in all of these cases, there
was no thought of any necessity of secrecy nor was there any
thought of possible litigation growing out of the condition of the
patient. More than likely, there was no desire for any secrecy at
the time and even the community was generally informed as to the
extent of the injury or mental condition and no one at the time
would have had any compunction or objection about the physician's
discussing what he saw and knew or giving the information he
had obtained; but when a question of litigation arises, when it is
important to know the real truth and when someone is trying to
take advantage to win a suit, the physician, who is the only person
qualified to testify with exactness, is prevented from doing so.
Both Wigmore and Greenleaf condemn these statutes. Greenleaf
has the following to say:
"As to the policy of the privilege, and of extending it,
there can only be condemnation. The chief classes of litigation
in which it is invoked are actions on policies of life insurance,
where the deceased's misrepresentations as to health are involved; actions for corporal injuries, where the plaintiff's
bodily condition is to be ascertained; and testamentary actions,
where the testator's mental condition is in issue. In all of
these cases the medical testimony is 'the most vital and reliable,' 'the most important and decisive', and is absolutely
needed for purposes of learning the truth. In none of them
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is there any reason for the party to conceal the facts except
to perpetrate a fraud upon the opposing party, and in the first
two of these classes the advancement of fraudulent claims is
notoriously common ....
In litigation about wills, policies,
and personal injuries, the privilege, where it exists, is known
in practice to be a serious obstacle to the ascertainment of
truth and a useful weapon for those interested in suppressing
it) '23
Wigmore discusses the question at length, making among
others, the following observations:
"That the relation of physician and patient should be
fostered no one will deny.
"But .... that the injury to that relation is greater than
the injury to justice - the final cannon to be satisfied - must
most emphatically be denied. The injury is decidedly in
the contrary direction. Indeed, the facts of litigation to-day
are such that the answer can hardly be seriously doubted. Of
the kinds of ailments that are commonly claimed as the subject
of the privilege, there is seldom an instance where it is not
ludicrous to suggest that the party cared at the time to preserve
the knowledge of it from any person but the physician. From
asthma to broken ribs, from ague to tetanus, the facts of the
disease are not only disclosable without shame, but are in fact
often publicly known and knowable by everyone - except
the appointed investigators of truth. The extreme of farcicality
is often reached in litigation over personal injuries, -in the
common case, a person injured by a street car amid a throng
of sympathizing onlookers. Here the element of absurdity will
sometimes be double; in the first place, there is nothing in the
world, by the nature of the injury, for the physician to disclose, which any person would ordinarily care to keep private
from his neighbors; and, in the second place, the fact which
would be most strenuously secreted and effectively protected,
when the defendant called the plaintiff's physician and sought
its disclosure, would be the fact that the plaintiff was not injured at all! Upon such a foundation of vain imaginations
is the privilege reared. The injury to justice by the repression
of the facts of corporal injury and disease is a hundredfold
greater than any injury which might be done by disclosure."'
The conclusions of. Wigmore and Greenleaf are fully justified
in view of the many amendments to the statutes and constructions
put on them by the courts to avoid the effect of the statutes. It
is a safe conclusion to say' that if every amendment of these statutes
231 GRELNLEAP, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899)

§ 247 a.

244 WiGuORE, EVIDENCE § 2380. See also id. §§ 2388, 2389.
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and every interpretation of the courts which have been adopted by
the several states should be adopted by all the states having such
statutes, none of the effect of the statutes in any of the states
would be left and those states would be right back at common law
where we now are in West Virginia.
It may be of interest to call more particular attention than
has already been done to our code provision which grants the
privilege in justice of the peace courts.25 The Supreme Court of
West Virginia has held in the case of Bachinsky v. Federal Coal
& Coke Co., 26 that an appeal from the justice's court may be tried
in the circuit court on the issues made in the justice of the peace
court, whether they be oral or in writing. There seems to be no
case in the state deciding what rules of evidence shall be used in
the circuit court on cases appealed from the justice. The Code
provides that all lawful evidence shall be heard in relation to the
matter in difference between the parties whether produced before
the justice or not.2 7 A logical conclusion would seem to be that
if rules of pleading used in the justice court may be used in the
circuit court, the rules of evidence used in the justice court may
also be used in the circuit court. This question, however, seems
never to have been decided in this state.
25 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 50, art. 6, § 10.
26 78 W. Va. 721, 90 S. E. 227 (1916).
a7 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 50, art. 15, § 9.
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